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Abstract
Each year increasing levels of development assistance are provided to promote 
growth and reduce poverty in less developed countries.  This is done, however, 
despite unresolved debates about the effectiveness of foreign aid.  Investigating a new 
approach to the topic in 1999, Burnside and Dollar introduced a conceptual 
framework in which the effectiveness of aid is contingent on the economic and 
political policies of the countries receiving it.  With its strong intuitive appeal, this 
hypothesis has attracted widespread attention, and yet the questions surrounding aid’s 
effectiveness remain controversial.  While the debate remains open-ended, this study 
reexamines Burnside and Dollar’s specification with new and updated data and builds 
on their model with new econometric estimation techniques.  Getting even a little 
closer to determining the true effects of foreign aid on developing countries is timely 
and valuable as calls and commitments for help are continuously rising.        
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1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign aid and development assistance have been aimed at alleviating 
poverty and poor growth long before theory or evidence ever addressed whether such 
aid was helpful.  The amount of such aid devoted to the developing world each year 
has increased enormously since the end of the Second World War.  A recent report 
published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
details a 13.3 percent increase in provisions for long-term aid programs and projects 
from 2003 to 2004 by members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) (OECD DAC, 2004).1  This 13.3 percent is a 7.7 billion dollar rise, making 
the overall total 79.5 billion dollars, and the amount is growing.  Forecasts for aid 
provisions over the next several years easily top 100 billion dollars.
In tandem with this significant rise in aid commitments, there has been an 
equally significant intensification of academic interest and debate over whether
foreign aid is beneficial to growth.  This paper seeks to review the various positions 
in this debate and utilizes newly available data to further the discussion.  In addition 
to reviewing past work, this paper will introduce a new approach to understanding 
available data with probit analysis.  The examinations here are of the macro results of 
aid, leaving room for further investigation of the channels through which aid affects 
growth.
1.1 Relevance
A motivating force for this research is the widespread attention foreign 
assistance has received in recent discussions despite inconclusive findings about the 
1
 The OECD encompasses nearly all Western European and North American donors, the principle 
foreign assistance providers for the developing world.  Long-term aid programs and projects excludes 
debt relief and emergency aid.
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effects of such aid.  Campaigns such as “ONE” to “make poverty history,” the 
American arm of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, are becoming 
increasingly widespread and have moved off of the desks of political elites and into 
the minds of many socially active individuals.  In the spring of 2005, a Group of 
Eight summit held in Scotland embodied many aspects of the major movement for 
development assistance that has been gathering steam for some time.  As 
development concerns receive increasing attention, an accurate understanding of how 
help can be best administered to those in need is crucial.
When knowledge is incomplete, fixation upon singular findings can lead 
policy astray.  In 2001, in regards to an influential paper published by Burnside and 
Dollar which is the focus of this research, the Canadian International Development 
Agency made a statement claiming that “World Bank researchers provide compelling 
evidence that good governance and a sound policy environment are the most 
important determinants of aid effectiveness” (qtd in Easterly, 2003).  Without any 
deprecation intended for the quality of Burnside and Dollar’s work, it must be 
observed that this is a bold statement to make in regards to any newly proposed 
theory.  Without further research and robust evidence, using such findings 
prematurely could result in misguided policy.  In this atmosphere of uncertainty about 
the effectiveness of development assistance, commitments continue to grow.  Aid 
from DAC countries is forecast to grow by nearly 50 billion dollars in real terms 
between 2004 and 2010, making overall aid from these countries nearly 130 billion 
dollars.  With the volume of aid rising, this paper should help clarify the issues 
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surrounding aid usage and provide a deeper understanding of aid and growth so that 
the most effective and efficient action can be taken to promote development.
1.2 Structure of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:  Chapter two will discuss 
the history and background of the dominant models describing aid’s effect on growth.  
The progression of thought and findings will be mapped out to illuminate the context 
of this work.  Also, an explanation of the model pursued in this paper will be 
provided, including a brief description of methodology.  The third chapter will 
discuss the model and data sources in detail.  The fourth chapter will discuss the 
empirical results of a review of the original specification of this paper with new, 
updated data.  Chapter five will develop a probit model and outline the results.  
Chapter six will conclude.
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2. BACKGROUND AND METHOD
That aid may not result in a one-for-one increase in growth became a popular 
objection and grounds for debate in the 1960s.  At the time, Chenery and Strout 
(1966) had recently outlined what still remains an important explanation for aid’s role 
in promoting growth: in less developed countries, a constraint on one major 
determinant of growth can limit the effects of other determinants, and aid can be 
employed to alleviate such a constraint.  Commonly this explanation is referred to as 
the two-gap model.  A number of changes are required for an economy to achieve 
self-sustaining growth, Chenery and Strout explain, such as an accumulation of 
human capital, increased saving and investment, technology adoption, etc.2  Less
developed countries, however, will have a difficult time effecting each of these 
factors simultaneously.  Attempts to augment production and output will be thwarted 
by inadequacies in any number of the areas required.  The result is a “bottleneck.”  
The economies of less developed countries will only be able to grow as quickly as 
their most limited factors of production.  In theory, aid can be provided to fill so-
called “gaps,” launching countries into growth.  One issue with this theory is 
presuming that donors and recipients can accurately identify gaps needing attention.  
Even if this can be accurately done, whether or not governments of developing 
countries commit received aid to these gaps is another problem altogether.
The concern many “revisionists” initially voiced against this model, however, 
was that aid could produce a reduction in saving among recipient countries.3  A 
2
 Pg. 680
3
 Two of the most popular “revisionist” critiques, outlined by Papanek (1972), are savings functions in 
which, (1) when foreign aid is available, the government effort to save or encourage saving will be 
reduced, or (2) the inflow of foreign aid will reduce investment opportunities and thus saving.
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reduction in saving would create a discrepancy between the returns from aid in the 
short- and long-term.  In the short-term, a spurious increase in well-being would 
appear because rather than saving, consumption would increase.  In the long-term 
production ability would fall.  Without saving, less developed countries will be 
unable to achieve self-sustained growth due to a dependence on aid, possibly 
resulting in a type of poverty trap.  If aid in fact reduces saving, it can reduce growth.  
In an early empirical study of the relationship between aid and growth,
Gustav Papanek (1972, 1973) set out to address the “revisionist” claims about saving.  
One particular aspect of his research examines an accounting technique he claims 
distorts the measurement of saving when aid is included.  He also observes that in 
situations involving economic shocks, such as a poor crop season, saving will be 
necessarily reduced and aid likely increased, creating a spurious correlation between 
the two.  To support his argument, Papanek estimated simple cross-country 
regressions and determined that aid does explain some portion of economic growth, 
partly refuting the revisionist critiques.  Nonetheless, these competing perspectives 
laid early groundwork for the debate about the impact of aid that has yet to be 
resolved.  Over time this discussion would evolve into determining whether aid is 
consumed or invested, with consumption being mostly wasteful for aid.
Over the next several decades, and still now, the empirics regarding the aid 
and growth relationship have remained largely inconclusive.  Research has been 
chronically plagued by problems such as data quality, econometric specifications, and 
causal mechanisms (Easterly et al., 2004).  Modest understanding has been uncovered 
about how aid is actually used: for investment, to promote saving, or for non-
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productive consumption.  Investigating the issue from a fresh perspective, Peter 
Boone at the London School of Economics produced an influential discussion paper
in 1996 that focused on the idea that “aid can also teach us about political regimes in 
recipient countries.”4  Extending the assumption that, to be effective, aid must be 
saved/invested rather than used for unproductive consumption, Boone investigated
what effect the character of a political regime has on the different usages of foreign 
aid.  Could political mediation explain the wide variation observed in results returned 
from aid?
Boone’s basic conclusion was that regime type does influence the returns 
expected from foreign assistance, with “elitist political regimes” providing the best 
predictions.  The majority of less developed countries exhibit political regimes of this 
elitist type—often repressive in nature—and thus aid does not produce growth largely 
because it is consumed by the elites in control.  Additionally, consumption nearly 
always contributes to an increase in the size of government.  Boone’s findings seem 
to quell optimism for foreign assistance efforts.  Boone does nuance his findings, 
however, by acknowledging that in liberal democratic regimes, although growth itself 
is not significantly affected by aid, indicators such as the infant mortality rate have an 
inverse relationship with aid received.  The key point: less repressive, more 
transparent regime types may facilitate more productive usage of aid.  Conceptually, 
Boone’s contribution about the linkages between government type and the uses of aid 
proved deeply insightful and opened an entirely new direction of investigation.
To explore the idea that government distortions can influence the 
effectiveness of aid more thoroughly, Burnside and Dollar (2000) derived a 
4
 Pg. 1
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specification to examine the conditions under which aid is effective.  Their proposal 
was that aid can positively affect growth, but that this effect is conditional on sound 
economic policies in the recipient country.  Such policies, from generally accepted 
growth theory, include limited budget deficits, controlled inflation, and openness to 
international trade.  Burnside and Dollar found results in support of their theory; good 
policies and aid contributed significantly to growth. These findings have received 
much attention and have become ubiquitous in subsequent research about the issue.
Within this history of the aid-growth relationship, the objective of this paper 
is two-fold: first, to further investigate the validity of Burnside and Dollar’s claims
via a recreation of their regressions with an expanded and refined data set.  This 
exercise has been done once since the publication of Burnside and Dollar’s paper by 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004).  Their results undermined those found by 
Burnside and Dollar, but since their examination new and updated data have again 
become available and another examination will provide a useful third set of results.  
Second, a new estimation technique will be introduced to explore the data with a 
unique method.  To the author’s knowledge, a probit model has not been used to 
examine aid and policies, and this will be employed to assess the determinants of the 
probability that a country will experience growth.  The benefit of this approach is that 
it will relax the continuous relationship specified by standard linear regressions and 
provide additional insight about the aid-growth relationship.
2.1 Methodology
The method employed in this study is an empirical analysis of aid and growth 
data sets.  As briefly mentioned, we will reexamine Burnside and Dollar’s claims 
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using their econometric model and the data set will be updated and expanded by an 
additional period of observations.  The original data set used by Burnside and Dollar 
was a database on foreign aid compiled by the World Bank.  These data ran from 
1970 to 1993 and Burnside and Dollar constructed panel data of six four-year 
intervals across 56 different countries.  This set was then expanded and updated by 
Easterly et al. (2004) to include data through 1997 and a number of new countries.  
Their expansion increased the number of observations to 356 from 275, across 62 
countries.  This paper adds an additional interval to the data, through 2001, increasing 
the number of observations to 400.  The country sample remains 62 countries.
The basic specification used by Burnside and Dollar that will be the starting 
point in this paper is a growth equation with growth of per capita real GDP expressed 
as a function of per capita real GDP, aid, a policy vector, a vector of other factors that 
affect growth, and fixed-time effects to capture initial levels and business cycles.  
The basic outline of these regressions is as follows:
(1) git = other terms + 1ait + error
(2) git = other terms + 1ait + 2aitpit + error
(3) git = other terms + 1ait + 2aitpit + 3a2itpit + error
(Source: Burnside and Dollar, Reply, 2004)
In these specifications, a represents aid, p is policies and g is growth.  The value and 
significance of the betas is of interest.
The second objective of the paper will involve estimating an alternative 
model that examines whether aid and economic policies help explain the probability a 
country experiences economic growth.  This approach uses a probit specification in 
which the dependent variable, per capita real GDP growth, will be defined as equal to 
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“1” for growth above a certain level and equal to “0” for growth below.  Several 
different levels of growth will be chosen to define the dependent variable in this way.  
A significant advantage of this approach is that it allows for potential threshold 
effects of aid on growth that a standard linear regression model cannot capture.  The 
results should thus provide further information in determining where and the 
conditions under which foreign aid is useful to developing countries.
Policies and the Effectiveness of Aid? Tresp
14
3. THE MODEL AND DATA SOURCES
This work’s initial objective is to revisit and reevaluate Burnside and Dollar’s 
empirical model with updated data.  The centerpiece of their unique specification is 
the previously discussed idea that the effectiveness of aid in promoting growth is 
contingent on the policies of the countries receiving it.  This aid-policy- growth 
hypothesis has received significant attention since its introduction, likely due largely 
to its simple, intuitive logic.
In 2004 Easterly, Levine and Roodman addressed Burnside and Dollar’s 
findings in a particularly noteworthy way by precisely recreating Burnside and 
Dollar’s method with an expanded data set.  These findings refuted Burnside and 
Dollar’s results by showing the aid-policy interaction to be only rarely significant.5
Since this exercise, however, more data have again become available.  Additionally, 
previous data have been revised and updated.  With more and better data available to 
examine, it is possible to conduct an even more thorough test of Burnside and 
Dollar’s specification.  For this purpose, we employ the exact specification used by 
Burnside and Dollar as a starting point.
3.1 The Growth Model
The fundamental interest of Burnside and Dollar’s paper, indeed of 
development economics, is to increase understanding of what produces economic 
growth.  For foundational guidance when constructing their specification, Burnside 
and Dollar turned to the existing growth literature.  After including several variables 
recognized to be critical for growth, Burnside and Dollar then extended the traditional 
5
 Table VII displays Easterly et al.’s findings in comparison with those from Burnside and Dollar and 
this paper.  See page 30.
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growth model to incorporate the elements of their hypothesis which included a 
regressor for aid, aid interacted with policies, and the square of aid interacted with 
policies.  The broad equation, as defined in their paper, is given by:
(4) git = yity + aita + pitp + aitpit1 + zitz + gt + it
The indices i and t are for countries and time periods, respectively.  The dependent 
variable, git, is per capita real GDP growth.  Initial per capita real GDP is indicated by 
yit, ait is aid as a fraction of GDP, pit is a vector of policies which affect growth, aitpit is 
the interaction of aid and policies, zit is a vector of additional exogenous variables that 
affect growth, gt represents fixed-time effects and it is an error term.  The neoclassical 
growth model explains why it is logical to include aid and policies in this growth 
equation (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  When considering growth, a sum of aid 
provided for a country is regarded as an income transfer.  This transfer is expected to 
have an impact on growth, whether through a rise in consumption or an increase in 
investment.  Similarly, the policies of a country will affect growth, and necessarily 
also affect the growth associated with the aid just received; likely, as Boone proposed, 
this affect will be the result of whether a country’s policies promote consumption or 
investment of the aid transfer.  Thus these terms appear in the equation individually 
and also interacted.  The specification, then, conforms with the hypothesis we have 
begun with, that the effectiveness of aid will be contingent on economic policies.  
What Burnside and Dollar ultimately found was that, as Boone discovered, aid itself 
had very little significance in contributing to growth, but when interacted with the 
policies of the recipient countries, it is significant.
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3.2 Description of the Variables and the Policy Index
What are the most relevant variables for determining growth and the 
effectiveness of aid?  There are two categories in this paper, as constructed by 
Burnside and Dollar.  The first, more heavily emphasized, group incorporates 
macroeconomic policies traditionally associated with growth in the empirical 
literature.  These policies, which comprise the vector, p, are inflation as a measure of 
monetary policy, the budget surplus relative to GDP, and a dummy variable 
constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995) to measure the openness of an economy.  As 
was argued earlier, vis-à-vis Boone, when aid is used for unproductive government 
consumption it is stripped of any opportunity to promote growth.  This is a major 
distortion of its effectiveness.  Although intended to indicate a country’s fiscal 
responsibility, the budget surplus happens to also be strongly, inversely related to 
government consumption.  The Sachs-Warner openness dummy includes five 
components.  A “closed” economy has any one of the following: average tariffs above 
40 percent on machinery and materials, a tight government monopoly of export 
goods, a black market premium above 20 percent, a socialist political regime, or an 
average of non-tariff measures, such as quotas, above 40 percent.  While these data 
are yearly, the data set constructed for this paper creates averages over four-year 
periods and thus the Sachs-Warner data is not entered in the regressions as a true 
dummy variable.
The second group of variables that Burnside and Dollar incorporate is 
composed of institutional and political factors that affect growth.  These variables are 
assumed to be exogenous and not affected by shocks to either growth or aid.  Such 
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factors include a measure of institutional quality developed by Stephen Knack and 
Phillip Keefer (1995) that reflects property rights and the efficiency of government 
bureaucracy, a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization developed by Easterly and 
Levine (1997), assassinations as a measure of civil unrest, and the broad money 
supply, M2, as an indicator of the development of the country’s financial system.  
Due to concerns of endogeneity, this variable is lagged one period.  Under the 
assumption that institutions, particularly government institutions, change slowly, the 
1980 figure for each country’s institutional quality is used throughout all periods.  The 
reasoning for including these societal and governmental factors in the growth 
equation is that ruptures among them, despite the best economic conditions, will 
seriously impede growth in a developing country.  For example, if property rights in a 
society are tenuous, even with excellent prospects individuals will refrain to some 
degree from private spending or investment.  High degrees of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, likewise, can be expected to deter cooperation between groups in 
society and certainly quell any governmental efforts at equitable development.  
While each of the macroeconomic policy variables affects the growth of an 
economy, in this paper a composite measure is used to encompass the three economic 
policy determinants in a single variable.  The reason for this is that due to 
multicollinearity, individually including each variable decreases the precision of the 
estimates on all of them.  In addition to providing more stable estimates, an overall 
policy index also offers more easily interpretable results and cleaner regressions.  The 
best method for constructing such an index, Burnside and Dollar decide, is by 
weighting each of the variables (the budget balance, inflation, and the Sachs-Warner 
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openness variable) according to the influence they have in a growth equation without 
aid.  That is, the coefficients resulting from the regression of per capita real GDP 
growth on the policy variables are the weights.  The same process is used in this paper 
for consistency.  Another way of describing the index is to say it is weighted
according to the variables’ correlation with growth.  A constant term is then 
determined by subtracting the fitted value of the three variables in the policy index 
evaluated at the mean from the value of the fitted growth regression line evaluated at 
the mean.  Precisely, the policy index shows the effects of the policy variables relative 
to the mean effects of the other growth regression variables over the sample.  This 
policy index is constructed for each regression and provides the values of the policy 
variable used in each regression.  
3.3 Estimation Techniques and a New Model
With these variables in place, ordinary least squares is used to evaluate the 
model.  Two-stage least squares is also used to examine any possible endogeneity of 
aid.  In the 2SLS regressions, the instruments are arms imports lagged, a dummy for 
Egypt, a Franc zone dummy, a Central American country dummy, the logarithm of 
initial income interacted with policy, the logarithm of population interacted with 
policy, arms imports lagged interacted with policy, the logarithm of initial income 
squared interacted with policy, and the logarithm of population squared interacted 
with policy.  Variations of the OLS and 2SLS regressions are done with and without 
outliers, and with and without low-income countries.  Outliers have been identified by 
the Hadi method.6  Those countries with an aid*policy value further than two standard 
6
 This method is a procedure for detecting multiple outliers in multivariate data.  It was established in a 
paper by Ali S. Hadi in 1992.
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deviations from the mean of the aid-policy interaction term were removed in those 
regressions excluding outliers.  Low-income countries were arbitrarily determined by 
Burnside and Dollar to be countries with an initial income of less than $1900 at the 
beginning of the regression periods, 1970.
To extend our study beyond a revisit of Burnside and Dollar’s approach, a 
probit method of estimation further examines the relationship between aid, policies, 
and growth.  This estimation technique’s use is motivated by an interest in modifying 
the continuous relationship demanded by OLS to examine the relationship in 
probabilistic terms.  The basic reasoning is, given a unit increase in a particular 
independent variable, ceteris paribus, what is the probability that a country will grow?  
Framing the relationship in this way clearly raises the issue of treating growth as a 
discrete variable of only two values: growth or no growth; “1” or “0.”  Normally, 
whether or not a country grows is not an exclusive concern, its rate of growth is more 
important.  
Nonetheless, artificially creating such a binary growth variable by determining 
a level or threshold of growth—above which the variable would be “1” and below 
which it is “0”—allows a probabilistic relationship to be broadly examined.  The 
mean level of annual per capita real GDP growth for the entire expanded data set used 
in this paper is 1.24 percent.  To cover a range around the mean, zero, one, and 1.75 
percent were chosen as thresholds for converting per capita real GDP into a binary 
variable.  The results, then, from a probit analysis reporting marginal effects will 
indicate what the change in probability of a country achieving at least 1 percent 
growth will be given a unit increase in an independent variable, in particular the aid-
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policy interaction term.  With zero as the threshold, the probit regression will examine 
what the change in probability of achieving any growth at all is for countries with an 
increase in aid and policies, and a threshold of 1.75 percent will examine the change 
probability of achieving greater than average growth.  Obtaining some sense of this 
threshold relationship between aid, policies, and growth may ultimately be more 
telling of real world scenarios and, even more importantly, may prove more useful for 
conducting aid allocation and usage in the future.
3.4 Structure and Sources of the Data
The described models have been estimated using panel data that initially 
covered 28 years and 56 countries.  This data set, assembled by Burnside and Dollar, 
covered the years 1966 to 1993 and was divided into seven four-year periods, the first 
from 1966 to 1970, with the data within each period averaged.  Only 56 countries 
were originally covered because, while large amounts of aid data are available, data 
covering the policy and institutional variables are harder to obtain.  
As mentioned, Easterly, Levine and Roodman revisited Burnside and Dollar’s 
work in 2004 to test its robustness by expanding the data set another period, extending 
it to 1997, and adding a number of countries making the total 62 with 356 
observations.  In this paper, the data are again built upon by adding yet another 
period, making total coverage reach from 1966 to 2001.  Although country coverage 
is not expanded upon from Easterly et al., the number of observations is now 400.  A 
second and equally, if not more, important contribution this paper makes is a thorough 
update and revision of past data.  By drawing on many newly updated primary 
sources such as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the OECD’s 
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Development Assistance Committee’s database, an expansion of the data has been 
accompanied by an update and recompilation of much of the past data.  
The biggest change or update to the data set has been done with perhaps the 
most important variable in this paper, aid.  The data Burnside and Dollar originally 
used were from a dataset constructed by World Bank economists to distinguish 
between grants and concessional loans in aid disbursements (Charles C. Chang et al., 
1998).  The idea was to add the grant component of concessional loans to formal 
grants as part of aid.  This measure, referred to as effective development assistance 
(EDA), however, relies on conventions of the World Bank’s Debt Reporting system, 
and can only be found for years in which the system was in place, from 1975 to 1995.  
Without the system, it is not possible to discern the grant component of loans.  To 
extend the data to previous years, an extrapolation had to be done by Chang et al. and 
Easterly et al. to fill in data points.  While effective development assistance is 
arguably a more accurate measure of aid, it is the author’s opinion that extrapolation 
and extension of these numbers through an even long period of time in this paper has 
the potential to negate any gains in accuracy made by the measure.  
Rather than simply extrapolate the effective development assistance data to 
cover the additional years, this paper uses the official development assistance (ODA) 
data as reported by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.  These data 
are much more complete, being readily available from 1966 through 2001, and were 
recently updated in December of 2005.  For use in regressions, ODA is then divided 
by the real GDP of each country, found in the Penn World Table constructed by Alan 
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Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, to show it as a share of GDP (2002).7
This measure is then consistent for describing purchasing power of a particular bundle 
of goods across all countries.  By including observations that have been recently 
updated, this paper’s measure of aid should be no less accurate, and in some ways 
arguably more accurate, than that used by Burnside and Dollar and Easterly et al.8
The remaining variables in the data set have retained the same definition as 
initially given by Burnside and Dollar.  The dependent variable in the model is the per 
capita real GDP growth rate.  This variable is among those that have been revised 
over all periods because of the recent update of the World Development Indicators 
2004.  In the probit regressions, the dependent variable is “1” for countries that 
experienced growth above a threshold of zero, one, or 1.75 percent, depending on the 
regression, and “0” otherwise.  All other variables retain the same values.  A table of 
the variables, their definitions, and sources can be found in the appendix.
7
 In the Penn World Table, real GDP actually means “PPP converted” rather than “in constant prices.”  
The reasoning for this change in the application of “real” is a fear of bias as the data moves further 
away in time from the base year.  Given the lengthy timeline of this paper’s data, this concern seems 
legitimate.
8
 Given the justification for using ODA, it should be noted that drawbacks to this measure include an 
underestimation of actual aid commitments due to the absence of the grant component of loans.
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4. INITIAL REGRESSIONS AND RESULTS
To thoroughly make use of the expanded and updated data set constructed for 
this paper, an extensive number of scenario combinations have been created resulting 
in a large number of regressions.  To review both Burnside and Dollar’s and Easterly 
et al.’s work, these combinations include regressions across each of the three time 
periods, 1970-1993, 1970-1997, and 1970-2001.  In each of these time periods, the 
regressions are run on the original countries included in the Burnside and Dollar 
research, referred to as “BD countries,” and the full sample of countries assembled by 
Easterly et al., referred to as “full sample.”  In addition to these criteria, regressions 
are done with and without outliers, and with OLS and 2SLS methods of estimation as 
discussed in section 3.  Each of these variations is also repeated for middle- and low-
income countries together, and only low-income countries.  The subsequent probit 
analysis assembles a similar set of scenarios for examination.  As described in the 
next section, this estimation technique was applied to the full time period 1970-2001 
exclusively.  The sample of BD countries, the full sample, and each income group for 
each binary threshold are examined.
Due to the large number of variations, the results presented in this paper have 
been selected to provide the most revealing, relevant and interesting information.  It 
can be assumed that results from variations described above not displayed in this 
paper did not return significant or relevant results for aid, aid*policy, or aid2*policy, 
unless otherwise indicated, and were left out.
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4.1 Results from Tresp data, BD Countries, 1970-1993, 1970-1997
As briefly discussed in the previous section, before running any regressions, 
the corresponding policy indices were needed.  To construct a policy index and have a 
policy variable, growth was regressed on the individual variables without aid terms 
for each variation.  As an illustrative example, for the period 1970-1993 with BD 
countries, per capita real GDP growth was regressed on initial GDP, ethnic 
fractionalization, assassinations, an interaction of ethnic fractionalization and 
assassinations, M2 as share of GDP lagged, a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
dummy for East Asia, the budget surplus, inflation, and the Sachs-Warner dummy 
from the Tresp data over the specified years and countries.  The resulting coefficients 
on the budget balance, inflation and openness variable were used to construct the 
policy index and policy variable with values unique to this specific regression.  This 
process was repeated for each of the combinations of time periods and country 
groupings.
With these variables in place, the regressions were run.  Results are presented 
in Table I for regressions run with BD countries over the periods 1970-1993 and 
1970-1997.  The regressions covering 1970-1993 and the BD countries is a direct 
recreation of the initial regressions run by Burnside and Dollar, but with new data.  
First, the results obtained from these regressions reveal the aid terms are not 
significant in any of the four regressions (columns (1)-(4)).  This is consistent with 
Boone’s claims about the effectiveness of aid and with Burnside and Dollar’s initial 
findings.  Second, when the outliers are excluded, in both the OLS, I (2), and 2SLS, I 
(4), regressions, the aid*policy term is significant at the 10-percent significance level.
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TABLE I - Growth Regressions: BD Countries, Tresp Data
1970-1993 1970- 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP 0.189 0.156 0.184 -0.367 0.144 0.133 0.170 -0.347
(0.519) (0.519) (0.517) (0.653) (0.459) (0.459) (0.459)  (0.556) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.650 -0.610 -0.603 -1.125 -0.395 -0.380 -0.344 -0.829
 (0.746)  (0.758)  (0.761)  (0.851)  (0.674)  (0.677)  (0.682)  (0.747) 
Assassinations -0.579** -0.563* -0.564* -0.519* -0.571** -0.564** -0.568** -0.533**
 (0.295)  (0.295)  (0.298)  (0.303)  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.228)  (0.227) 
Ethnic Fractionalizations 
* Assassinations 1.019** 0.984* 0.991* -1.125 0.910** 0.901** 0.907** 0.789*
(0.515) (0.516) (0.522) (0.524) (0.403) (0.405) (0.412) (0.404)
Institutional Quality 0.296** 0.329** 0.333** 0.318** 0.300** 0.318** 0.325** 0.297**
(0.139) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.127) (0.129) (0.134) (0.132)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.023* 0.024* 0.023* 0.031**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.031 -1.074 -1.119 -0.487 -1.062 -1.044 -1.162* -0.493
 (0.752)  (0.762)  (0.759)  (0.786)  (0.680)  (0.684)  (0.687)  (0.702) 
East Asia 1.149* 1.347** 1.349** 1.425** 1.344** 1.426** 1.480** 1.445**
(0.591) (0.592) (0.599) (0.602) (0.497) (0.499) (0.517) (0.518)
Policy Index 0.955** 0.799** 0.787** 0.613** 0.969** 0.888** 0.844** 0.706**
(0.203) (0.207) (0.227) (0.248) (0.187) (0.189) (0.226) (0.224)
Aid/GDP 0.150 0.059 0.139 -0.462 0.077 0.009 0.086 -0.513*
(0.130) (0.154) (0.130)  (0.316) (0.111) (0.135) (0.105)  (0.274) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.028 0.158* 0.223 0.280* 0.022 0.094 0.161 0.221*
(0.060) (0.095) (0.159) (0.152) (0.054) (0.081) (0.165) (0.120)
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.025 -0.018
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
R – squared 0.3686 0.3736 0.3725 0.3465 0.3672 0.3687 0.3694 0.3386
Observations 276 273 276 273 325 323 325 323
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  The results in this table are from regressions done with only those 
countries originally included in the Burnside and Dollar data set.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
Burnside and Dollar found similar results, although the coefficients they found were 
slightly more significant.  In regressions including outliers, however, the aid*policy 
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terms are insignificant, a finding inconsistent with Burnside and Dollar, who found 
aid* policy coefficients that were significant even with outliers.  For the regressions 
run over the period 1970-1997 the results show even less significance for the aid-
policy terms.  Aid is again generally insignificant, apart from one regression, but 
aid*policy is only significant at the 10-percent level with 2SLS estimation, I (8).  
Easterly et al. found similar results with their data over each of these regressions.  
Direct comparisons of the three sets of results are available in table VII.  With 
outliers, Easterly et al. also found no significance for the aid*policy term.  When 
aid2*policy is introduced in columns I (3) and I (7) the sign on these terms is negative.  
The coefficients, however, are insignificant in both 1970-1993 and 1970-1997.  
Besides the coefficients on the aid and aid*policy regressors, it is interesting 
to note the insensitivity of the other variables to the various regressions.  Both the 
magnitudes and significances of the variables remain quite similar across the four 
variations for each period.  The coefficients on assassinations, institutional quality, the 
East Asia dummy, and the policy index are consistently significant throughout.  The 
R-squared terms also remain relatively consistent across this set of regressions, 
hovering around 0.37.  
4.2 Results from Tresp data, Full Sample, 1970-1993, 1970-1997
After recreating the regressions run by Burnside and Dollar we turn to the full 
sample of countries provided by Easterly et al.  The results from these regressions, run 
over the same two periods, are presented in Table II.  The results in this table are a 
recreation of Easterly, Levine and Roodman’s research, in particular those in columns 
II (5) – II (8). 
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TABLE II - Growth Regressions: Full Sample, Tresp Data
1970- 1993 1970- 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Initial GDP 0.018 -0.052 -0.062 -0.427 0.032 -0.113 -0.124 -0.414
(0.498)  (0.523)  (0.520)  (0.652)  (0.08)  (0.435)  (0.443)  (0.560) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.120 -0.143 -0.185 -0.449 0.067 0.024 -0.016 -0.228
 (0.790)  (0.791)  (0.784)  (0.856) (0.687) (0.689)  (0.685)  (0.753) 
Assassinations -0.342 -0.341 -0.349 -0.296 -0.396 -0.389 -0.394 -0.362
 (0.332)  (0.331)  (0.333)  (0.339)  (0.252)  (0.250)  (0.250)  (0.254) 
Ethnic Fractionalizations 
x Assassinations 0.181 0.175 0.193 0.045 0.223 0.197 0.206 0.104
(0.806) (0.804) (0.804) (0.823) (0.657) (0.653)  (0.653)  (0.665)
Institutional Quality 0.270* 0.276** 0.264* 0.289** 0.265** 0.265** 0.255** 0.263**
(0.140) (0.140)   (0.139) (0.141) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126)
M2/GDP (lagged) -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.475** -1.379* -1.35* -1.069 -1.581** -1.427** -1.410** -1.110*
 (0.733)  (0.739)  (0.735)  (0.753)  (0.662)  (0.664)  (0.660)  (0.673) 
East Asia 1.486** 1.425** 1.297** 1.631** 1.729** 1.579** 1.505** 1.656**
(0.598) (0.602) (0.601) (0.613) (0.505) (0.501) (0.503) (0.527)
Policy Index 0.917** 0.931** 1.024** 0.681** 0.924** 1.00** 1.072** 0.815**
(0.208) (0.210)  (0.216) (0.240)  (0.187) (0.192) (0.199) (0.232)
Aid/GDP 0.174 0.117 0.140 -0.259 0.140 0.059 0.076 -0.291
(0.107) (0.142) (0.121) (0.305) (0.094) (0.126) (0.104) (0.261) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.020 0.029 -0.049 0.176 0.022 -0.007 -0.077 0.112
(0.042) (0.085) (0.071) (0.138)  (0.046) (0.073) (0.070) (0.115)
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy 0.004 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
R – squared 0.3472 0.3244 0.3498 0.3102 0.3362 0.3192 0.3429 0.3054
Observations 300 295 300 295 357 353 357 352
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  "All countries" indicates those countries added to the data set by 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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The regressions of the full sample provide little support for Burnside and 
Dollar’s findings.  Although aid is again never significant, as expected, neither is the 
aid*policy term in any of the variations over the two periods.  These findings are 
closely consistent with Easterly et al.’s.  When examining this larger sample of 
countries it appears that the impact of aid on growth as a function of policies is 
insignificant.  The quadratic term, aid2*policy, is significant in regression II (7), but 
the coefficient is only slightly different than zero.  In the regressions with the full 
sample, the assassinations variable loses significance, but the institutional quality 
variable, regional dummies, and policy index are consistently significant.
4.3 Results from Tresp data and the New Period, 1970-2001
Having recreated the regressions done in past research to assess the results 
with updated data, the next step is to introduce regressions over the period 1970-2001 
with data available for the first time for this paper.  As noted, the review of past 
results has thus far revealed the aid*policy term is significant only when regressed 
over BD countries.  This observation raises questions about a potential systematic 
difference between the countries Burnside and Dollar examined to those included by 
Easterly et al.  To further address this issue, regressions done over the new period 
have been done with both BD countries and the full sample.  Another difference in the 
new regressions is the absence of the assassinations and ethnic fractionalization* 
assassinations variables.  The reason for this absence is the lack of availability of new 
data.  Results are reported in Table III.
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The new period of data extends the number of observations to 398 for this set 
of regressions and should provide the most complete set of results to date.  
Immediately noteworthy are the results in III (2) and III (4) for the aid*policy term. 
TABLE III - Growth Regressions: New Data, 1970-2001
BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP -0.057 -0.064 -0.023 -0.353 -0.104 -0.257 -0.260 -0.430
 (0.441)  (0.439)  (0.441)  (0.536)  (0.393)  (0.418)  (0.419)  (0.534) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.104 0.102 0.147 -0.226 0.236 0.163 0.146 -0.012
(0.602) (0.609)   (0.607)  (0.680) (0.635) (0.637) (0.632)  (0.696) 
Institutional Quality 0.352** 0.371** 0.376** 0.350** 0.287** 0.288** 0.279** 0.280**
(0.121)  (0.122) (0.126)  (0.124) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119)  (0.123)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.024** 0.024** 0.024** 0.029** 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.289* -1.297* -1.399** -0.885 -1.536** -1.397** -1.383** -1.122*
 (0.667)  (0.675)  (0.674)  (0.687)  (0.629)  (0.634)  (0.627)  (0.638) 
East Asia 1.155** 1.279** 1.290** 1.363** 1.545** 1.469** 1.363** 1.574**
(0.503) (0.507) (0.517) (0.521) (0.514) (0.516) (0.512) (0.533)
Policy Index 0.961** 0.834** 0.818** 0.658** 0.935** 0.960** 1.065** 0.801**
(0.189) (0.193) (0.226) (0.234) (0.185) (0.194) (0.198) (0.236)
Aid/GDP 0.073 -0.002 0.080 -0.385 0.148* 0.043 0.075 -0.215
(0.107)  (0.132) (0.100)  (0.254)  (0.086) (0.117) (0.099)  (0.240) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.036 0.142* 0.197 0.262** 0.027 0.029 -0.067 0.129
(0.056) (0.085) (0.161) (0.123) (0.046) (0.080) (0.070) (0.117)
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.021 0.007**
 (0.018) (0.004)
R – squared 0.3442 0.3462 0.3468 0.3314 0.3113 0.2924 0.3173 0.2861
Observations 360 355 360 347 398 390 398 381
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  The results in this table are from regressions done without 
assassination data due to difficulties in locating it.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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The coefficients are positive and significant at the 10 and 5 percent significance 
levels, respectively.  The corresponding aid terms are insignificant, again as expected.  
Although these values support the aid-policy hypothesis, they also advance the 
concern of a systematic difference in the counties of the data set used by Easterly et 
al.  As can be seen, the corresponding results for the full sample, III (6) and III (8), are 
not significant.  Institutional Quality, the regional dummies, and the policy index are 
the predominantly significant variables.  Interestingly, the money supply is significant 
for BD countries, but insignificant for the full sample.  The full sample results do not 
support the aid-policy hypothesis.  The seemingly systematic differences in results for 
the Burnside and Dollar countries versus the full sample will examined below.  
4.4 Low-Income Country Regressions
Each of the regressions described in the first three parts of this section were 
run with both middle- and low-income countries.  Middle-income countries are 
excluded from the following regressions with the reasoning that these countries may 
already have reasonable access to capital markets and credit; if this is true, the effects 
of aid may be quite different for middle-income countries.  Low-income is arbitrarily 
defined by Burnside and Dollar as having a per capita real GDP of less than $1900 at 
the beginning of the period, 1970.  This definition is maintained in this paper for 
consistency.
The results from these regressions are in Tables IV and V.  In regressions for 
low-income countries from the BD countries sample, there is not a single significant 
aid*policy term for either 1970-1993 or 1970-1997 (the table of these results can be 
found in the appendix, Table A-VI).
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TABLE IV - Growth Regressions: Low-Income Countries, Full Sample
1970- 1993 1970- 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No No Yes No No
Initial GDP -0.330 -0.314 -0.664 -0.418 -0.405 -0.571
 (0.513)  (0.517)  (0.549)  (0.441)  (0.426)  (0.480) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.524 -0.484 -0.732 -0.253 -0.223 -0.368
 (0.911)  (0.917)  (0.969)  (-0.802)  (0.807)  (0.859) 
Assassinations -0.917* -0.925* -0.840 -0.897** -0.903** -0.894**
 (0.517) (0.512)  (0.535)  (0.366)  (0.363)  (0.368) 
Ethnic Fractionalizations * 1.479 1.418 1.049 1.205 1.184 1.120
Assassinations (1.043) (1.053)       (1.081)       (0.829)       (0.833)       (0.829)
Institutional Quality 0.314** 0.328** 0.379** 0.264* 0.277* 0.270*
      (0.153)      (0.155)       (0.152)       (0.142)       (0.143)       (0.146)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.014
     (0.018)     (0.018)       (0.019)       (0.014)       (0.014)       (0.015)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.260* -1.304* -1.154 -1.347** -1.362** -1.219*
 (0.706)  (0.710)  (0.743)  (0.624)  (0.625)  (0.672) 
East Asia 0.888 1.165* 1.401* 1.297** 1.471** 1.313**
     (0.694) (0.686)       (0.724)    (0.565)       (0.556)       (0.649)
Policy Index 1.454** 1.263** 0.969** 1.441** 1.295** 1.363**
      (0.331)       (0.324)       (0.416)       (0.304)       (0.287)       (0.466)
Aid/GDP 0.176 0.128 -0.212 0.108 0.066 -0.032
(0.120)       (0.141)  (0.287)       (0.105)       (0.124)  (0.261) 
Aid/GDP * Policy -0.142* -0.029 0.091 -0.150* -0.049 -0.067
 (0.082)  (0.098)       (0.177)  (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.164) 
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy 0.006* 0.008**
(0.004)       (0.004)
R – squared 0.4416 0.4063 0.3931 0.4147 0.3822 0.3770
Observations 204 199 199 244 240 239
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  The "full sample" includes those countries added 
to the data set by Easterly, Levine and Roodman.  Low-income countries are those with a per capita real GDP or 
less than $1900 at the beginning of the time period.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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In Table IV, with regressions of low-income countries from the full sample, the 
aid*policy variable appears significant in those regressions including a quadratic 
term.  The variable, however, is significantly negative at the 10 percent level.  The 
quadratic terms are each significant and positive. 
TABLE V - Growth Regressions: Low-Income Countries, 1970-2001
BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP -0.247 -0.241 -0.204 -0.519 -0.239 -0.479 -0.496 -0.634
 (0.459)  (0.453)  (0.467)  (0.472)  (0.409)  (0.441)  (0.442)  (0.494) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.104 -0.117 -0.078 -0.378 0.262 0.159 0.160 0.206
 (0.694)  (0.698)  (0.698)  (0.774) (0.701) (0.704) (0.702)  (0.770)
Institutional Quality 0.477** 0.503** 0.502** 0.494** 0.327** 0.329** 0.317** 0.306**
(0.139) (0.141) (0.150) (0.147) (0.139) (0.139) (0.137)  (0.140)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.032** 0.031** 0.032** 0.035** 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.527** -1.518** -1.614** -1.164* -1.646** -1.474** -1.474** -1.240*
 (0.579)  (0.587)  (0.594)  (0.644)  (0.580)  (0.586)  (0.578)  (0.649) 
East Asia 0.970* 1.193** 1.191* 1.129* 1.476** 1.304** 1.070* 0.899
(0.576)  (0.587) (0.637) (0.650) (0.587) (0.589) (0.584) (0.660)
Policy Index 1.202** 0.982** 1.002** 0.910* 1.108** 1.197** 1.409** 1.526**
(0.274) (0.305) (0.385) (0.478) (0.254) (0.295) (0.296) (0.509)
Aid/GDP 0.098 -0.010 0.092 -0.322 0.169* 0.030 0.085 -0.005
(0.112) (0.153) (0.105)  (0.256) (0.095) (0.118) (0.100)  (0.237) 
Aid/GDP * Policy -0.007 0.120 0.142 0.165 0.004 -0.008 -0.145* -0.133
 (0.065) (0.110) (0.211) (0.195) (0.055) (0.094) (0.083) (0.184) 
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.017 0.010**
(0.021) (0.004)
R – squared 0.4045 0.4067 0.4063 0.3916 0.3589 0.3365 0.3727 0.3328
Observations 241 237 241 232 270 263 270 257
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  Low-income countries are those with a per capita real GDP of less that 
$1900 at the beginning of the period.  The results in this table are from regressions done without assassination data due to difficulties 
in locating it.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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In other words, the implied impact of aid with regard to policies in low-income 
countries is a reduction of growth.  This obviously seems quite counterintuitive.  If the 
results are not nonsensical, one understanding may involve how aid is put to use in 
low-income countries as opposed to middle-income countries.  As Boone’s work 
suggested, aid used for nonproductive consumption will not result in growth.  For 
low-income countries it may infeasible to incorporate aid into investment projects, 
and they may instead be inclined to utilize aid for necessary and immediate 
consumption.  The result may be a dependency on aid for day-to-day living and an 
actual decrease in production. This negative significance of aid*policy is also seen in 
the regressions run over the new period, 1970-2001, and full sample in Table V.  
Regression V (7), involving the quadratic term, produces a negative, significant 
coefficient on the aid*policy term.
This collection of regressions focused on testing the findings of Burnside and 
Dollar’s paper and tended to show that the significance of their findings is unique to 
their country selection.  Table VII displays the results for the aid*policy terms of the 
various regressions across the three principle papers discussed for a quick comparison 
of findings.  This table plainly displays the exclusivity of significant findings for the 
BD countries sample.  No regression results involving the full sample presented in 
this chart were found to be significant.  While this seems to suggest weakness in 
Burnside and Dollar’s theory, the lack of balance between their country sample and 
the full sample raises questions about drawing such a conclusion.  Before supporting 
either Burnside and Dollar or Easterly et al, an examination of the potential systematic 
difference in the two country samples, which seems to be in fact real, must be done.
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TABLE VII - Comparison of Results for Aid*Policy Term in Growth Regressions
Low-/Middle-Income Low-Income
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Burnside and Dollar original 0.19** 0.18* 0.26** 0.25**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 270 270 184 184
0.34** 0.56** 0.38** 0.56**Easterly, Levine and Roodman data, 
BD Countries, 1970-1993 (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.25)
Observations 268 268 178 178
Tresp data, BD Countries, 1970-1993 0.158* 0.28* 0.149 0.284
         (0.09) (0.15)          (0.11)          (0.19)
Observations 273 273 182 182
ELR data, full sample, 1970-1993 -0.08 0.11 -0.13 0.01
(0.12) (0.21) (0.14) (0.20)
Observations 291 291 199 199
Tresp data, full sample, 1970-1993 0.029 0.176 -0.029 0.091
         (0.09) (0.14)  (0.10)          (0.18)
Observations 295 295 19 199
ELR data, BD countries, 1970-1997 0.30* 0.38* 0.40** 0.47
(0.15) (0.22) (0.17) (0.31)
Observations 310 310 207 207
Tresp data, BD countries, 1970-1997 0.094 0.221* 0.090 0.221
(0.08) (0.12)          (0.10)          (0.16)
Observations 323 323 217 217
ELR data, full sample, 1970-1997 -0.15 0.01 -0.2 -0.2
(0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.31)
Observations 345 345 236 236
Tresp data, full sample, 1970-1997 -0.007 0.112 -0.049 -0.067
 (0.07) (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.16) 
Observations 353 352 240 239
Tresp data, BD countries, 1970-
2001† 0.142* 0.262** 0.120 0.165 
         (0.08)          (0.12)          (0.11)          (0.19)
Observations 355 347 237 232
Tresp data, full sample, 1970-2001† 0.029 0.129 -0.008 -0.133
         (0.08)          (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.18)
Observations 390 381 263 257
Notes:  BD original and ELR data refer to the results acquired with data used by the respective authors.  Tresp data refers to the 
data set described in this paper.  All results are from regressions that excluded outliers.  Low-income countries are defined by a 
per capita real GDP of less than $1900 at the beginning of the period, 1970.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Original
chart from: Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004.
† These regressions excluded assassination data
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
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Another particularly interesting aspect of Table VII is that the findings of this 
paper are qualitatively similar to those of the previous studies, despite the different 
definition of foreign aid.  It can be clearly seen from this direct comparison that, 
although the values of the coefficients and standard errors are different, there does not 
seem to be a difference in the quality of results returned between the two types of aid 
considerations, EDA or ODA.  This is a finding consistent throughout all of the 
variables and regressions and allays concerns about the change in the aid variable.  
In their response to Easterly et al.’s challenge to their results, Burnside and 
Dollar insist that countries new to the full sample contribute to the insignificance of 
the findings.  The fact that aid and policy continue to be significant in regressions 
involving BD countries, but not in regressions with the full sample, supports Burnside 
and Dollar’s argument.  
The additional countries contributed by Easterly et al.’s study are Burkina 
Faso, Congo, Iran, Jordan, Mali, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Uganda 
(Burnside and Dollar, Reply, 2004).  When determining outliers by the Hadi method, 
the observations are rank ordered by their distance from the mean.  Observations 
further than two standard deviations from the mean of the aid-policy interaction term 
were removed in regressions excluding outliers in this study.  However, upon review 
of the method it was noticed that the next twenty observations, which were not 
removed from regressions excluding outliers as they were just within two standard 
deviations of the mean, included two observations from Jordan, two from Mali, one 
from the Congo, and one from Uganda.  In the next ten observations, Burkina Faso, 
the Congo, Papua New Guinea and Uganda all again appeared.  The high 
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concentration of observations added by Easterly et al. that are near the cut-off for 
outliers may explain part of the systematic insignificance of findings using their 
country sample.  
Individual examination of the countries also reveals interesting peculiarities.  
Iran for example, experienced several periods of reasonable growth despite quite poor 
policies and less than average amounts of aid.  A country such as Iran may have found 
this growth possible with strong oil exports throughout the period due to the high 
costs of energy.  Papua New Guinea and Jordan, on the other hand, show relatively 
poor growth corresponding to somewhat decent policies and inflows of aid.  Any 
number of factors may create this situation, but particularly suspect would be high 
levels of corruption in government despite desirable policies and poor opportunities 
for investment.  Such scenarios would clearly undermine the relationship under 
investigation in this paper, and it is noteworthy to find a concentration of such 
countries in the group used by Easterly et al. to expand the sample sample.  More in-
depth analysis of these countries and the causes for the relationships between aid, 
policies and growth within them is necessary before deciding if these countries are 
anomalous to the data set, or if they simply provide observations that were initially 
missing, causing Burnside and Dollar’s data to be unbalanced.
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5. PROBABILISTIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE EFFECTS OF AID
After minimal success in finding convincing results examining past models, 
the next objective is to introduce this paper’s unique examination of the relationship 
between aid, policies and growth.  The properties and economic implications of probit 
estimation provide an intuitive approach that proves quite appealing for both an 
understanding of the effects of aid and policy on growth and the implications for 
creating aid distribution policies.  
By treating growth as a binary variable, taking a value of “1” for growth above 
a certain rate and “0” for growth below, a probit model can provide information about 
the change in the probability of the threshold level of growth being achieved by 
incremental changes in the independent variables around specified levels.  These 
marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the independent variables.  For 
example, the marginal effect reported in a probit regression equals the change in 
probability that growth of a specified level will occur from a one unit increase in the 
variable (Dougherty, 2002).  Reporting the effects of these variables on growth in a 
probabilistic way relaxes the continuous relationship implied by OLS and allows for a 
broader understanding of the effects of aid and policy.  Another way of saying this is, 
rather than seeking a one-for-one relationship between aid*policy and growth, the 
probit model will reveal whether there is significant change in the probability of 
achieving growth of a particular threshold given a marginal change in an independent 
variable.
As briefly mentioned in section 4, probit regressions were estimated with both 
the BD countries and the full sample of countries, and middle- and low-income 
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countries, and only low-income countries.  Only the full period 1970-2001 is 
examined.  Threshold levels chosen for determining the binary growth variable, 
“igrow,” are zero percent, one percent, and 1.75 percent.  As mentioned, the mean 
level of per capita real GDP growth is 1.24 percent for the sample and these 
thresholds have been chosen to investigate a range of levels of growth around the 
mean.  
Also, these threshold levels may provide an indirect glimpse of the effect of 
aid*policy on groupings of countries organized by their level of growth.  What these 
thresholds may reveal is that aid*policy is more or less effective among countries that 
are experiencing more or less growth.  The reason such a finding may occur is 
presumably the ability of these countries to incorporate aid into effective investment, 
vis-à-vis policies.  A similar hypothesis was advanced in regards to the negative 
coefficients on aid*policy for the low-income countries.  Countries with low growth 
may be losing out due to bad policies, in which case the change in the  probability of 
growth corresponding to a marginal increase in aid*policy would be expected to have 
little to no significance.  On the other hand, countries with a healthy growth rate, 
possibly due to good a good policy environment, should show a higher sensitivity to a 
marginal increase in aid*policy.
5.1 Probit Results
Overall, the results from the probit analysis closely mirror the results found 
from OLS and 2SLS earlier in the paper.  The aid variable appears insignificant in all 
variations of the model except in two scenarios.  These are the regressions that use the 
BD set of middle- and low-income countries, excluding outliers at the zero percent 
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and one percent thresholds.  (The full set of results is given in Tables AVIII through 
AX in the appendix.)  Aid, in these particular cases, is actually negatively significant, 
implying that the change in probability of achieving growth of zero and one percent, 
respectively, is actually reduced with a unit increase in aid.
The variable of more immediate concern in this paper, aid*policy, is presented 
in table XI.  This table displays the coefficients and significance levels on just these 
variables in the various regressions with the corresponding threshold levels specified 
in the left-hand column.  Several things are noteworthy about the results from the 
probit model.  First, reinforcing the trend identified and discussed in the previous 
section, the results that are significant are primarily from the BD countries sample.  
This can be clearly seen in columns XI (2) and XI (6) and further emphasizes the need 
for review of the countries incorporated in the full sample.  
This oddity aside, it appears that among the countries in the BD sample, with 
outliers excluded, aid interacted with policy nearly always has a significant, positive 
effect on the probability of growth.  That is, along column XI (2) for example, a unit 
increase in aid*policy will increase the probability of growth being greater than zero 
percent by 3.1 percentage points, of growth being greater than one percent by 4.0 
percentage points and of growth being greater than 1.75 percent by 4.4 percentage 
points.  These marginal effects are all evaluated at the mean and are significant at 10 
and 5 percent levels.  The uniformity of these results is an important finding for 
determining the effects of aid and policy.  While OLS and 2SLS did not reveal a 
consistent relationship between aid, policies, and growth, the probit model reveals a 
consistently significant effect of aid interacted with policy on the probability of 
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growth occurring.  In other words, while we do not consistently find a continuous 
relationship between aid, policies and growth, it seems that we can be reasonably 
confident that aid interacted with good policy will probably produce growth..
The fact that these significance levels increase with the threshold level of 
growth used to determine the binary values of the growth variable is also an 
interesting finding.  As discussed above, using increasing levels of growth to 
determine the binary value of “igrow” provides an indirect method of observing what 
countries or economic conditions are more sensitive to aid and policies.  In the results 
below, not only do the results become more strongly significant, but the marginal 
effects on the probabilities also rise.  The conclusion to be drawn from the results in 
column XI (2) is that countries with healthy growth, presumably due in part to good 
policies to begin with, will be more sensitive to increases in aid, all else remaining 
constant.      
Table XI - Comparison of Probit Analysis Results for Aid * Policy Coefficients
Middle-/Low-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
BD Countries Full Sample BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
0.030 0.031* -0.019 0.003 0.000 0.022 -0.053* -0.009
Per capita real
GDP Growth  0 
%
    (0.029)     (0.018)  (0.025)     (0.014)     (0.037)     (0.021)  (0.031)  (0.016) 
0.027 0.040** -0.031 0.003 0.007 0.041* -0.052 0.000
Per capita real 
GDP Growth 
1.0 %
  (0.033)     (0.020)  (0.027)     (0.016)     (0.042)     (0.024) (0.033) (0.020)
0.025 0.044** -0.010 0.015 -0.003 0.040* (-0.041) 0.01Per capita real GDP Growth 
1.75 %
    (0.033)     (0.019)  (0.026)     (0.017)  (0.041)     (0.023) (0.034) (0.021)
Observations 360 355 400 391 241 237 272 264
Notes: For the probit analysis, the dependent variable, per capita real GDP growth, is made a 1 if it is greater-than or equal to the 
percentage specified in the left-hand column.  The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of a change in aid * policy 
reported at the mean.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Pseudo R2 measures in appendix.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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The irony of this particular finding, of course, is that as a country grows more quickly, 
and thus can use aid more effectively, it may in fact need aid less.  Inversely, 
countries suffering from poor growth that are in most need of help seem to be 
insensitive to increases in aid, and least able to make use of it.  The situation does, 
however, appear better for low-income countries in this probit approach than it did 
from OLS and 2SLS as there are actually positive, significant affects of aid*policy 
observed in column XI (6).
While considering these results, however, it must be noted and kept in mind 
that these findings and conclusions are true only for the probit model applied to the 
BD country sample excluding outliers.  This is clearly a restricted data sample, 
causing concern for robustness.  Anticipating these objections, I would like again to 
point out the possibility of a systematic difference in the country samples examined.  
Although findings from the BD country sample allow a reasonable confidence in their
validity, nonetheless, a greater degree of confidence would arise from more support in 
the full sample.    
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has undertaken to revisit, revise, and extend previous research 
examining the relationship between aid and growth in developing countries, starting 
first with a review of foundational literature and ultimately pursuing a highly debated 
model to contribute to the ongoing discussion.  Empirical examination of the effects 
of development aid has been a point for discussion since the amount of disbursements 
began to grow dramatically post-World War II.  While it is natural to hope that such 
aid always does good for developing nations, revisionists in the 1960s challenged 
these assumptions with the proposition that aid in fact is often squandered and does 
not result in growth for recipients.  This challenge prompted important empirical 
research by Papanek (1972, 1973) that seemed to show positive effects of aid.  
Nonetheless, the debate endured.
Over the ensuing decades, leaps and bounds were made in the construction of 
growth models and the study of factors that influence growth.  Among these findings 
was the distinction between consumption and investment, and the concept that broad, 
self-sustaining growth must arise from the later.  In this framework, several studies of 
development aid argued that if aid is used for nonproductive consumption, the result 
will be a spurious one time improvement of well-being.  When employed in 
investments, however, aid can result in growth.  With a fresh direction of 
investigation of this matter, Peter Boone (1996) at the London School of Economics 
produced a paper revealing the effectiveness of aid as a function of the political 
regimes of states receiving it.  Oppressive, undemocratic regimes routinely ruin any 
potential for aid to help growth, he concluded.  Alternatively, Boone found results that 
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suggested indicators such as infant mortality rates were inversely related to degrees of 
openness exhibited by democratic governments.  This finding, although a small piece 
of Boone’s paper, opened a new theoretical approach.
Pursuing Boone’s research, Burnside and Dollar produced the work used as 
the centerpiece of this paper relating the effectiveness of aid to the policies of the 
country receiving it.  The logic is powerful: governments, as the direct recipients of 
aid, must determine the effectiveness of it via the quality of their economic and 
political policies.  Burnside and Dollar found results favoring their hypothesis.  
Easterly, Levine and Roodman reexamined Burnside and Dollar’s work with an 
expanded data set.  Their results were much more ambiguous and left the matter 
unresolved.
In an attempt to provide more definitive evidence to support or refute Burnside 
and Dollar’s hypothesis, this paper set out to revisit their work in a manner similar to 
Easterly et al., and then also examine their hypothesis from a unique perspective.  To 
accomplish these goals, two things were done: the data were updated and revised to 
re-run the Burnside and Dollar specification and a new model was fit to explore the 
relationship.  
Updating and revising the data for this data set was an involved and time-
consuming process.  In addition to expanding the data set to include newly available 
data for the period 1998-2001, a recompilation of past data was done from revised 
original sources.  In this process, several variables were altered, including the measure 
of aid, for the reasons discussed above.  With this improved data set, the paper 
reevaluated both Burnside and Dollar’s and Easterly et al.’s work, testing the 
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robustness of their results.  Unfortunately, many conclusions remain uncertain.  
Regressions involving BD countries seemed to provide significant results when 
outliers were removed, supporting Burnside and Dollar’s hypothesis.  When the full 
sample was considered, however, the results were nearly never significant, refuting 
Burnside and Dollar’s hypothesis.  A possible issue with the data involved in the full 
sample was examined; the observations added by Easterly et al. seem to be unusually 
clustered near the outliers.  Ultimately the country and observation issue remains to be 
resolved.  Considering those countries exclusive to the BD countries sample, 
however, it is clear that the interaction of aid and policies is significant for some 
recipients of aid.  The conclusion drawn from this paper is not as robust of as that 
Burnside and Dollar arrived at.
To approach the relationship between aid, policies and growth from another 
direction, a probabilistic relationship provided by a probit model was examined.  This 
model again uncovered a systematic difference between the results from the BD 
countries sample and the full sample.  The model applied to the BD countries sample 
returned significant findings for the aid*policy variable showing that for an 
incremental increase in the aid*policy variable around its mean, the probability of 
achieving a particular level of growth increases.  Interestingly, the significance and 
magnitude of these results increased as the threshold used to determine the binary 
growth variable increased.  The economic and intuitive implications of this finding 
are that the impact of aid and policies is greater for countries that have a particular 
level of growth.  This follows from and fits with the discussion of aid as used for 
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consumption or investment.  The idea is that countries with healthier growth would be 
better able or more willing to incorporate aid into investment projects.
Considering all of these findings together, the appropriate conclusion to draw 
seems to be that the importance of policies to the application of aid cannot be 
discounted.  The effectiveness of aid may not be as contingent on good policy as 
Burnside and Dollar initially argued, but the continued significance of findings using 
the countries they initially explored suggest it is certainly important.  Additionally, the 
introduction of the probit model revealed that a significant, positive increase in the 
probability of growth is associated with an increase in the aid-policy interaction term.  
From a policy making point of view, this is an important understanding.  Easterly’s 
concern about the overzealous application of such findings in policy during the initial 
stages of Burnside and Dollar’s research, however, was clearly well founded given the 
lack of significant convincing results in his research (Easterly, 2003).  
An important lesson of this paper is that the interaction of aid and policy is not 
significant for all countries.  What causes this occasional significance should be the 
focus of further study.  In this manner, the systematic difference of results between 
Burnside and Dollar and Easterly et al. may prove to be a useful anomaly.  Between 
the two samples is an already clearly defined set of countries that could provide a 
handful of case studies useful for determining the factors that make the interaction of 
aid, policies, and other determinants of growth significant.  As the amount of 
development assistance provided to the developing world continues to increase, 
furthering the understanding of such relationships could not be timelier to help ensure 
that we provide aid in the most effective way possible.
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APPENDIX
Description of Variables Used in Regressions
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Initial GDP Initial PPP GDP of the period, 1970; 
log taken for regressions
Summers and Heston, 1991; World 
Penn Tables
Measure of societal conflict Easterly and Levine, 1997Ethnic 
Fractionalization
Assassinations Banks, 2002Measure of assassinations and 
attempts in a year
Institutional Quality Knack and Keefer, 1995Average of 5 variables to measure 
the quality of government and 
bureaucracy; 1980 value used 
throughout
M2/GDP World Bank Indicators, 2004Broad measure of money supply as
share of GDP to gauge development 
of financial system; lagged one 
period
Budget Balance World Bank Indicators, 2004Measure of surplus or deficit; taken 
as share of GDP
Inflation Input as natural log of 1 + rate World Bank Indicators, 2004
Sachs-Warner Sachs and Warner, 1995Measure of openness of an economy 
by 5 factors
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy Variable
East Asia Dummy Variable
Aid Official Development Assistance; 
taken as share of GDP
Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC); OECD
Measured in percentage terms World Bank Indicators, 2004Per capita real GDP 
Growth
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Tables of data not in text of paper.
TABLE AIV - Growth Regressions: Low-Income, BD Countries
1970-1993 1970-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Outliers Included? Yes No No Yes No No
Initial GDP -0.028 -0.068 -0.643 -0.061 -0.127 -0.523
 (0.501)  (0.499)  (0.560)  (0.458)  (0.451)  (0.470) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.849 -0.849 -1.329 -0.676 -0.703 -1.060
 (0.911)  (0.911)  (1.004)  (0.813)  (0.811)  (0.874) 
Assassinations -1.079** -1.026** -0.895* -1.092** -1.032** -0.957**
 (0.492)  (0.503)  (0.540)  (0.358)  (0.361)  (0.379) 
Ethnic Fractionalizations * 1.655 1.579 1.082 1.568* 1.490* 1.142
Assassinations       (1.021)       (1.021) (1.045)       (0.810)       (0.804)       (0.804)
Institutional Quality 0.468** 0.460** 0.511** 0.416** 0.405** 0.433**
      (0.162)      (0.154)       (0.159)       (0.157)       (0.147)       (0.154)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.034** 0.032* 0.035* 0.044** 0.044** 0.047**
      (0.017)      (0.018)       (0.018)       (0.015)       (0.015)       (0.015)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.350* -1.272* -0.912 -1.340** -1.160* -0.854
 (0.705)  (0.701)  (0.750)  (0.638)  (0.620)  (0.661) 
East Asia 1.453** 1.326* 1.526** 1.650** 1.465** 1.588**
      (0.705)       (0.682)       (0.729)       (0.625)       (0.554)       (0.607)
Policy Index 0.888** 0.959** 0.654 0.910** 1.040** 0.763*
      (0.351)       (0.310)       (0.410)      (0.376)       (0.288)      (0.392)
Aid/GDP 0.162 0.054 -0.484 0.107 -0.001 -0.453*
      (0.136)       (0.178)  (0.299)       (0.107)  (0.150)  (0.275) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.264 0.149 0.284 0.211 0.090 0.221
      (0.187)       (0.112)       (0.187)       (0.209)       (0.095)      (0.158)
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.033* -0.026
(0.019) (0.021)
R – squared 0.4744 0.4751 0.4426 0.4557 0.4545 0.4292
Observations 185 182 182 219 217 217
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth.  The results in this table are from regressions done 
with only those countries originally included in the Burnside and Dollar data set.  Low-income countries are 
those with a per capita real GDP or less than $1900 at the beginning of the time period.  Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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TABLE AVIII - Probit Analysis, Marginal Effects, Per capita real GDP growth  0%, 1970-2001
Middle-/Low-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
BD Countries Full Sample BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP -0.144** -0.147** -0.153** -0.153** -0.158* -0.150* -0.178** -0.175**
 (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.081)  (0.080)  (0.072)  (0.075) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.288** 0.276** 0.226** 0.242** 0.258* 0.253* 0.209 0.229*
(0.122) (0.121) (0.115) (0.116) (0.145) (0.142) (0.132) (0.136)
Institutional Quality 0.062** 0.064** 0.024 0.028 0.073** 0.078** 0.016 0.021
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.64)  (0.027)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.485** -0.469** -0.393** -0.400** -0.469** -0.465** -0.331** -0.347**
 (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.095)  (0.093)  (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.103)  (0.104) 
East Asia -0.033 -0.024 -0.002 0.025 -0.179 -0.126 -0.134 -0.039
(0.128)  (0.123)  (0.118) (0.114)  (0.179)  (0.162)  (0.158)  (0.140) 
Policy Index 0.146** 0.138** 0.168** 0.150** 0.227** 0.180** 0.270** 0.210**
(0.048) (0.044) (0.046) (0.041)  (0.086) (0.077) (0.076)  (0.066)
Aid/GDP -0.030 -0.044* -0.029 -0.028 -0.024 -0.037 -0.017 -0.018
(0.024)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.022) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.030 0.031* -0.019 0.003 0.000 0.022 -0.053* -0.009
(0.029) (0.018) (0.025) (0.014) (0.037) (0.021) (0.031) (0.016) 
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 (pseudo) 0.2825 0.2815 0.2294 0.2218 0.3168 0.3131 0.2385 0.2220
Observations 360 355 400 391 241 237 272 264
Notes: For the probit analysis, the dependent variable, per capita real GDP growth, is made a 1 if it is greater-than or equal to 0-
percent for regressions 1-4 and if it is greater-than or equal to 1-percent for regressions 5-8.  The coefficients reported are the
marginal effects of a change in the independent variables, dF/dx, reported at the mean.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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TABLE AIX - Probit Analysis, Marginal Effects, Per capita real GDP growth  1.0%, 1970-2001
Middle-/Low-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
BD Countries Full Sample BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP -0.094 -0.095 -0.116** -0.109* -0.108 -0.096 -0.154* -0.142*
 (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.090)  (0.089)  (0.081)  (0.080) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.042 0.031 0.095 0.112 0.019 0.019 0.087 0.107
(0.132) (0.132) (0.123) (0.124) (0.154) (0.152) (0.145)  (0.144)
Institutional Quality 0.050** 0.056** 0.016 0.021 0.046 0.054* 0.007 0.012
(0.024) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026)  (0.026)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.006* 0.006* 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.275** -0.266** -0.263** -0.274** -0.243* -0.247** -0.237** -0.252**
 (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.122)  (0.121)  (0.107)  (0.106) 
East Asia 0.137 0.154 0.143 0.176 0.047 0.100 0.061 0.144
(0.116) (0.112) (0.108) (0.104) (0.151) (0.137) (0.136) (0.123)
Policy Index 0.164** 0.148** 0.186** 0.158** 0.240** 0.184** 0.268** 0.198**
(0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.046) (0.090) (0.081) (0.081) (0.072)
Aid/GDP -0.040 -0.053* -0.033 -0.028 -0.044 -0.059 -0.031 -0.028
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.029) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.027 0.040** -0.031 0.003 0.007 0.041* -0.052 0.000
(0.033)  (0.020)  (0.027) (0.016) (0.042) (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.020) 
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007*
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
R2 (pseudo) 0.2234 0.2248 0.1828 0.1723 0.2326 0.2301 0.1823 0.1626
Observations 360 355 400 391 241 237 272 264
Notes: For the probit analysis, the dependent variable, per capita real GDP growth, is made a 1 if it is greater-than or equal to 0-
percent for regressions 1-4 and if it is greater-than or equal to 1-percent for regressions 5-8.  The coefficients reported are the 
marginal effects of a change in the independent variables, dF/dx, reported at the mean.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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TABLE AX - Probit Analysis, Marginal Effects, Per capita real GDP growth  1.75%, 1970-2001
Middle-/Low-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
BD Countries Full Sample BD Countries Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outliers Included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Initial GDP -0.072 -0.070 -0.103 -0.090 -0.116 -0.102 -0.164* -0.139
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.090)  (0.090)  (0.084)  (0.081) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.075 0.075 0.107 0.121 0.159 0.141 0.212 0.205
(0.125)  (0.127) (0.119) (0.119) (0.146)  (0.147) (0.142) (0.140)
Institutional Quality 0.075** 0.078** 0.037* 0.038* 0.064** 0.075** 0.027 0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026)
M2/GDP (lagged) 0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.259** -0.279** -0.262** -0.284** -0.279** -0.309** -0.273** -0.292**
 (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.114)  (0.113)  (0.103)  (0.101) 
East Asia 0.295** 0.308** 0.307** 0.326** 0.167 0.240* 0.192 0.272
(0.111) (0.106) (0.103) (0.099) (0.151) (0.137) (0.140) (0.127)
Policy Index 0.140** 0.123** 0.145** 0.122** 0.269** 0.194** 0.284** 0.203**
(0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.048) (0.091) (0.082) (0.088) (0.078)
Aid/GDP -0.023 -0.039 -0.027 -0.026 -0.014 -0.037 -0.014 -0.017
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
Aid/GDP * Policy 0.025 0.044** -0.010 0.015 -0.003 0.040* -0.041 0.006
(0.033) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.041) (0.023) (0.034) (0.021)
(Aid/GDP)2 * Policy -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
R2 (pseudo) 0.213 0.2201 0.1824 0.1761 0.2467 0.2547 0.2135 0.2004
Observations 360 355 40 391 241 237 272 264
Notes: For the probit analysis, the dependent variable, per capita real GDP growth, is made a 1 if it is greater-than or equal to 0-
percent for regressions 1-4 and if it is greater-than or equal to 1-percent for regressions 5-8.  The coefficients reported are the 
marginal effects of a change in the independent variables, dF/dx, reported at the mean.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
Policies and the Effectiveness of Aid? Tresp
51
Bibliography
Boone, Peter.  “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid.”  Discussion Paper 272.  
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 1995.
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar.  “Aid, Policies, and Growth.”  The American 
Economic Review.  90 (2000):  847-868.
---.  “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Reply.”  The American Economic Review.  94 
(2004): 781-784.
Chang, Charles C., Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, and Luis Serven, “Measuring Aid 
Flows: A New Approach,” Working Paper 2050, World Bank, Washington, 
DC, 1999.
Chenery, Hollis B. and Alan M. Strout.  “Foreign Assistance and Economic 
Development.”  The American Economic Review.  56 (1966): 679-733.
---.  “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development: Reply.”  The American 
Economic Review.  58 (1968): 912-916.
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.  “Aid Rising Sharply, According to Latest OECD Figures.”  
2004.
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, et al.  “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth.”  The 
Economic Journal.  114 (2004): F191-F216.
Dougherty, Christopher.  Introduction to Econometrics.  Second Edition.  Oxford 
University Press, 2002.
Easterly, William, et al.  “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment.”  The American 
Economic Review.  94 (2004): 774-780.
Policies and the Effectiveness of Aid? Tresp
52
Easterly, William.  “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?”  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.  17.3 (2003): 23-48.
Easterly, William and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Politics and Ethnic 
Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 1203–1250.
Goldsmith, Arthur A. “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa.”  International 
Organization.  55.1 (2001): 123-148.
Hansen, Henrik, and Finn Tarp.  “Aid and Growth Regressions.”  CREDIT Research 
Paper 00/7.  Centre for Research in Economic Development and International 
Trade, University of Nottingham, 2000.
Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and 
Politics, 7 (1995), 207-27.
Levy, Victor.  “Does Concessionary Aid Lead to Higher Investment Rates in Low-
Income Countries?”  The Review of Economics and Statistics.  69 (1987): 
152-156.
Mosley, Paul, et al.  “Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in Less Developed 
Countries.”  The Economic Journal.  97 (1987): 616-641.
Murphy, Robert G.  “Does Household Debt Help Forecast Consumer Spending?”  
Dept. of Economics at Boston College, 2000.
Newlyn, Walter T.  “The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries: A Comment.”  The Economic Journal.  
83 (1973): 867-869.
Policies and the Effectiveness of Aid? Tresp
53
Pack, Howar, and Janet Rothenberg Pack.  “Foreign Aid and the Question of 
Fungibility.”  The Review of Economics and Statistics.  75 (1993): 258-265.
Papanek, Gustav F.  “Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings, and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries.”  The Journal of Political Economy.  81 (1973): 120-
130.
---.  “The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries.”  The Economic Journal.  82 (1972): 934-950.
Sachs, Jeffrey D., Warner, Andrew, Aslund, Anders, and Stanley Fischer.  “Economic 
Reform and the Process of Global Integration.”  Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1995 (1995): 1-118.
Summers, Robert and Alan Heston, “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded 
Set of International Comparisons, 1950-88.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106 (1991), 327–68.
World Bank (2004), World Development Indicators 2004, database, Washington, DC
